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UNITAS VIA DIVERSITAS. CAN THE 
COMMON EUROPEAN SALES LAW 
HARMONIZE THROUGH DIVERSITY?
Gary Low*
§1. INTRODUCTION
Th e proposed Regulation for a Common European Sales Law (CESL),1 unveiled on 
11 October 2011, marks the opening legislative salvo on the future of European contract 
law. Besides critique from private lawyers on the substantive content therein,2 the legality 
of the CESL under Union law may be called into question.3 Th e CESL cites Article 114 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as its legal basis.4 In 
so doing, it goes against the grain of received wisdom: virtually all the studies on the 
subject ruled out the use of Article 114 TFEU in favour of Article 352 TFEU insofar as 
the chosen vehicle is an optional instrument.5
* Assistant Professor of Law, Maastricht University, Maastricht European Private Law Institute. Email 
<gary.low@maastrichtuniversity.nl>. Th is article is based on a presentation given on 9  December 
2011 at a round table seminar in Brussels entitled ‘Th e Proposed Common European Sales Law – have 
the right choices been made?’. I thank Maartje de Visser and Mihaela Carpus-Carcea for valuable 
comments on an earlier draft . Any views and all errors herein are exclusively my own.
1 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European 
Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 fi nal.
2 For instance, the European Review of Private Law devoted the entire sixth and fi nal issue of its 2011 
volume to critiquing the rules in the CESL.
3 Amongst others, whether the diversity of contract laws constitutes an obstacle to the single market 
within the meaning of Article 114 TFEU (see variously Chapters 2, 3 and 5 of G. Low, European Contract 
Law between the Single Market and the Law Market (Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen 2011)), and also 
whether Article 114 TFEU covers the CESL’s facilitative and internal mandatory rules (which will be 
considered within the context of the relationship between Articles 34 and 114 TFEU by the author in an 
upcoming working paper).
4 Ibid., p. 8 and 9 of the explanatory memorandum.
5 See for instance M.W. Hesselink, J.W. Rutgers and T.Q. De Booys, ‘Th e Legal Basis for an Optional 
Instrument of European Contract Law’, Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working 
Paper No. 2007/04, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1091119 (last visited 2  February 2012); K. Gutman, ‘Th e 
Commission’s 2010 Green Paper on European Contract Law: Refl ections on Union Competence in Light 
of the Proposed Options’, 7 European Review of Contract Law 2 (2011), p. 151–172; J.J. Kuipers, ‘Th e Legal 
Basis for a European Optional Instrument’, 19 European Review of Private Law 5 (2011), p. 545–564.
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Th e choice of legal basis matters inter alia for the following reasons. It determines 
the procedure for adopting legislative instruments. Th at is to say, whether a qualifi ed 
majority of votes or unanimity in the Council is required, as well as what the role of 
the European Parliament is in shaping the measure. Additionally, if the wrong basis is 
chosen, the measure risks being annulled by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU).
Th ese considerations are by no means moot, largely since Parliament has been a 
constant supporter of the CESL,6 whereas the Council7 and a number of Member States’ 
parliaments8 have questioned the merit of Union intervention beyond reform of the 
consumer acquis and into the area of facilitative contract law. Th ese considerations may 
have infl uenced the Commission’s choice of legal basis9 – selecting Article 114 TFEU 
allows it to take the ‘path of least legislative resistance, [allowing] a minority of political 
malcontents in Council [to] be overridden’,10 but which therefore gives rise to the 
prospect of litigation before the CJEU.
Th e CESL is an optional instrument; ostensibly leaving Member States’ laws intact. 
Th is being the case, the appropriateness of Article 114 TFEU as the basis for the 
measure may be questioned. Specifi cally, this paper considers whether the CESL can 
be characterized as a measure for the ‘approximation of the measures laid down by law 
(…) in Member States’11 within the meaning of Article 114 TFEU, thus withstanding 
possible judicial scrutiny. Case law casts doubt not only as to the CESL’s choice of legal 
basis, but also as to Article 114 TFEU as the basis for similar instruments in overcoming 
bottlenecks in other areas of the single market.
Th e remainder of this article is structured as follows. §2 introduces the topic of legal 
bases for optional instruments. §3 focuses on what the term ‘approximation’ means. Two 
6 See for instance European Parliament, Resolution on European Contract Law, [2004] OJ C76 E, para. 
14; European Parliament, Resolution on European Contract Law and the revision of the acquis: the way 
forward, [2006] OJ C 292E/109; and European Parliament, Resolution on the Communication from the 
Commission tot the European Parliament and the Council – An area of freedom, security and justice 
serving the citizen – Stockholm programme, No P7_TA(2009)0090 of 25 November 2009 at para. 99.
7 See for instance Council of the European Union, A More Coherent European Contract Law, [2003] OJ 
C 246/1; Council of the European Union, General Secretariat, Consolidated version of the conclusions 
of the Council on the setting up of a Common Frame of Reference for European contract law, No 
14745/09, 21  October 2009; European Council, General Secretariat, Conclusions – 10/11  December 
2009, EUCO 6/09, and Consolidated version of the conclusions of the Council on the setting up of a 
Common Frame of Reference for European contract law, para. 4 to 9.
8 Th e reasoned opinions of the Austrian and German parliaments doubt whether an optional 
instrument can ever be based on Art. 114, available at www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/document/
COM20110635FIN.do (last visited 20 December 2011).
9 But see S. Weatherill, ‘Th e Limits of Legislative Harmonisation Ten Years aft er Tobacco Advertising: 
How the Court’s Case Law has become a “Draft ing Guide”’, 12 German Law Journal (2011), p. 827–864 
(suggesting that the legislative procedure is not the only reason why Article 114 TFEU is an attractive 
basis to use).
10 See G. Low, European Contract Law between the Single Market and the Law Market, p. 49.
11 Article 114(1) TFEU.
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alternatives are then proposed in conceiving of the CESL as a measure that approximates 
the laws of Member States. §4 advances the argument that the CESL is an intermediate 
step towards harmonization, whilst §5 examines whether the fact that the CESL is a 
second national regime has any bearing on whether it approximates the relevant national 
laws. §6 concludes these discussions.
§2. THE LEGAL BASES FOR OPTIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Since the Commission’s 2001 Communication12 exploring reform in the area of contract 
law, the possibility of introducing an optional instrument has been discussed in every 
subsequent Commission policy paper in the past decade.13 Th is is in part due to the 
Union’s growing aversion to traditional methods of harmonization,14 its recent keenness 
in using optional instruments to overcome bottlenecks in the single market, and ‘an 
additional benefi t of this model is that it provides a reference point and an incentive for 
the convergence of national regimes’.15 Such is its political attraction that broader policy 
documents like the Digital Agenda for Europe,16 the Single Market Report,17 the Europe 
2020 Strategy,18 and Project Europe 203019 all call for the adoption an optional pan-
European contract law instrument as part of the strategy to complete the single market 
and encourage economic growth.
12 Communication from the Commission concerning the consequences of the judgment given by the 
Court of Justice on 20 February 1979 in Case 120/78 (‘Cassis de Dijon’), [1980] OJ C 256/2.
13 E.g. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A More 
Coherent European Contract Law – An Action Plan, COM (2003) 68 fi nal.
14 See EurActiv, ‘Commission to test 28th Regime for online sales law’, 10  October 2011, quoting 
Commissioner Reding as saying that ‘[w]e have gone through the limits of the full harmonization 
(approach) we must try to [integrate the single market] in a diff erent way’, www.euractiv.com/
consumers/commission-test-28th-regime-online-sales-law-news-508220 (last visited 14  December 
2011).
15 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Single Market for 21st Century 
Europe, COM (2007) 725 fi nal, p.  93. See also the Opinion of the European Economic and Social 
Committee, Th e 28th Regime – an alternative allowing less lawmaking at Community level, [2011] OJ C 
21/26, Section 3.3.3.
16 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee for the Regions on A Digital Agenda for Europe, 
COM (2010) 245, especially p. 12–13.
17 M. Monti, A New Strategy for the Single Market – At the Service of Europe’s Economy and Society, 9 May 
2010, http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti_report_fi nal_10_05_2010_en.pdf (last visited 28  October 
2010), especially p. 93–4.
18 Communication from the Commission: Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth, COM (2010) 2020, especially p. 19.
19 Project Europe 2030 – Challenges and Opportunities, A report to the European Council by the Refl ection 
Group on the Future of the EU 2030, p.  41, www.refl ectiongroup.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/
refl ection_en_web.pdf (last visited 28 October 2010).
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Yet there is nothing novel, per se, about Union measures in the form of optional 
instruments.20 Th ese have been around for almost two decades, pioneered in the fi elds of 
company law by way of the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG),21 the Statute 
for a European Cooperative Society (SCE),22 and intellectual property in the form of 
the Community Trade Mark.23 Besides the CESL, plans are afoot to introduce optional 
regimes for savings and insurance products,24 charitable foundations,25 and patents.26 
A recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) paper highlighted the attractiveness of 
using an optional pan-European regime to regulate systemic risk and insolvency in the 
banking sector.27
It is trite law that a Union measure must rest on a competence conferred on by 
the Treaties.28 In addition, a specifi c legal basis is to be preferred over a general one.29 
Furthermore, Union law recognizes the use of dual legal bases, unless those bases are 
mutually exclusive.30 Juxtaposing these points with the choice of legal basis for the 
aforementioned optional instruments, it is noted that all the instruments, save the 
proposed patents regime, are based on precursors to Article 352 TFEU. Th e following 
two points may explain this use of the most general of legal bases. Firstly, there was 
no specifi c Union competence for intellectual property until Article 118 TFEU was 
inserted post-Lisbon, thus allowing the 2010 proposal on patents to be based on it.31 
Secondly, the prevailing institutional view was that there was for other fi elds of law 
no other legal basis – including that of Article 114 TFEU – suitable for measures of an 
optional nature.
Let us now return to the subject of European contract law. Th ere is no specifi c legal 
basis endowing the Union with competence to legislate generally across the fi eld of 
20 For a succinct overview of the rise of optional law and the reasons for it – see J. Smits, ‘Optional Law: 
A Plea for Multiple Choice in Private Law’, 17 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 4 
(2010), p. 347–352.
21 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the European Economic Interest Grouping 
(EEIG), [1985] OJ L 199/1.
22 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1435/2003 of 22  July 2003 on the Statute for a European Cooperative 
Society (SCE), [2003] OJ L 207/1.
23 Council Regulation (EC) No. 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark, [1994] OJ L 
11/1.
24 European Commission, Green Paper on Financial Services Policy, COM (2005) 177, p. 11.
25 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Foundation (FE), COM (2012) 35 fi nal.
26 Proposal for a Council decision authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary 
patent protection, COM (2010) 790.
27 W. Fonteyne et al., ‘Crisis Management and Resolution for a European Banking System’, IMF Working 
Papers Series WP/10/70, p.  55, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft /wp/2010/wp1070.pdf (last visited 
15 November 2011).
28 Article 5(1) TEU.
29 Case 45/86 Commission v. Council [1987] ECR 01493.
30 Case C-116/07 European Parliament v. Council (‘Fund for Ireland’) [2009] ECR I-7135. See K. Gutman, 
European Review of Contract Law (2011), p. 161–163; J.J. Kuijpers, 19 European Review of Private Law 
(2011), p. 548. It should be said that case law is unsettled as to when legal bases are mutually exclusive.
31 Th e proposal is also based on Article 326 TFEU (enhanced cooperation).
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contract law. Previous studies have thoroughly considered and dismissed the suitability of 
provisions such as Articles 81 and 169 TFEU, covering procedural rules32 and consumer 
protection33 respectively, and there is no further need to revisit the issue. What remains 
available are therefore Articles 114 and 352 TFEU.
Article 114(1) TFEU states that the Union may adopt ‘measures for the approximation 
of the provisions (…) in Member States which have as their object the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market’. Th e operative part of Article 352 TFEU empowers 
the adoption of measures where ‘action by the Union should prove necessary (…) to 
attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the 
necessary powers’. Th e wording of Article 352 TFEU makes it clear that the provision 
is one that may be used when no other legal basis is suitable. Th is means that the two 
articles are mutually exclusive, rendering any discussion of dual legal bases unnecessary 
insofar as this contribution is concerned.34
As regards the form35 of the Union measure, then, the appropriateness of the 
Commission’s choice of legal basis for an optional instrument like the CESL turns on 
whether this measure approximates the contract laws of the Member States within the 
meaning of Article 114 TFEU. If it does not, and given that there is no specifi c Union 
competence in this area of law, then it may be said that the Treaties have not provided the 
necessary powers to adopt an optional instrument and that Article 352 TFEU remains the 
sole legitimate basis for the CESL. If it does, then insofar as the CESL can be compared 
to its counterparts in company and intellectual property law, then the rationale for the 
use of Article 352 TFEU in all other past and future optional regimes might be called 
into question.
§3. ‘APPROXIMATION’ WITHIN THE MEANING OF 
ARTICLE 114 TFEU
Th e term ‘approximate’ suggests some manner of harmonization or replacement of 
Member State laws, and there are countless examples of Union measures that bear out 
this suggestion. Whether ‘approximation’ can mean something more was a question 
32 See J.J. Kuijpers, 19 European Review of Private Law (2011), p. 549–555.
33 Ibid.
34 Th is view is not universally shared – see K. Gutman, European Review of Contract Law (2011), p. 163, 
who cites Case C-116/07 Fund for Ireland but also observes that there is as yet no case on using 
Articles 114 and 352 TFEU as dual legal bases.
35 Th is article leaves aside whether other requirements of Art. 114 TFEU are met – e.g. whether the actual 
or potential obstacles to cross-border trade or distortions of competition are appreciable in the sense 
required by Case C-376/98 Germany v. European Parliament and Council (“Tobacco Advertising”) 
[2000] ECR-8419. Th is is a point picked up by the Belgian, Swedish and UK Parliaments in their 
reasoned opinions to the CESL, see www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/document/COM20110635FIN.
do (last visited 20 December 2011).
Unitas via Diversitas
19 MJ 1 (2012) 137
considered in European Cooperative Society.36 Council Regulation 1435/2003 established 
the Statute for a European Cooperative Society, an optional pan-Union corporate entity 
that, while obviating the need for incorporation in any single Member State, did not per 
se harmonize or replace the latter’s company laws. Th e Commission’s choice of legal basis 
was Article 308 EC (now Article 352 TFEU). Parliament challenged this choice of legal 
basis, arguing that Article 95 EC (now Article 114 TFEU) was the correct basis for the 
Regulation.37
Th e relevant portion of the applicant’s case is set out as follows: the term ‘approximation’ 
in Article 114 TFEU included not only measures designed to remove obstacles to cross-
border trade or distortions of competition, but also those aimed at ‘overcoming the 
territorial boundaries of national legal orders’.38 Th e term ‘approximation’ did not 
‘necessarily [imply] substitution, whether total or partial, for the national provisions’.39 
Furthermore, it contended that the Regulation merely re-bundled existing national legal 
rights, and did not create new legal rights or set up a new legal form apart from those that 
existed in the legal systems of Member States.40
Th e CJEU rejected the aforementioned arguments. Since ‘the contested regulation (…) 
leaves unchanged the diff erent national laws already in existence’, the Court observed, it 
‘cannot be regarded as aiming to approximate the laws of the Member States (…) but has 
as its purpose the creation of a new form of cooperative society in addition to the national 
forms’.41 Th e Court was not persuaded by the fact that this European legal form did ‘not 
lay down exhaustively all the rules applicable to European cooperative societies and that, 
for certain matters, it refers to the [applicable national law] since (…) that referral is of a 
subsidiary nature’.42 Th e application for annulment was dismissed, indicating that the 
proper legal basis is Article 352 TFEU. Implicit in the judgment is the Court’s rejection 
that any measure seeking to merely overcome the problems of legal diversity to the single 
market is suffi  cient to trigger the use of Article 114 TFEU. Th is must be correct. To reason 
otherwise is to render the term ‘approximate’ otiose. As regards the CESL’s choice of legal 
basis, some manner of change to Member States’ contract laws is therefore required.
36 Case C-436/03 European Parliament v. Council (‘European Cooperative Society’) [2006] ECR I-3733.
37 What motivated Parliament to challenge the basis was the fact that measures based on Article  308 
TFEU required only consultation with Parliament, whereas Article 95 EC measures are based on co-
decision (now known as the ordinary legislative procedure) between Council and Parliament. Th is is no 
longer the case post-Lisbon. Under Article 352 TFEU, there is no longer any need to consult Parliament, 
which, however, now wields a veto over legislative proposals based on this provision.
38 Case C-436/03 European Cooperative Society, para. 21.
39 Ibid., para. 22.
40 Ibid., para. 25 and 26. Cf. Advisory Opinion No. 1/94, Competence of the Community to conclude 
international agreements concerning services and the protection of intellectual property [2004] ECR 
I-05267.
41 Case C-436/03 European Cooperative Society, para. 44. Emphasis added.
42 Ibid., para. 45.
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§4. ARTICLE 114 VERSUS ARTICLE 352 TFEU
A. AN INTERMEDIATE STEP TOWARDS HARMONIZATION
It is stated in its preamble that the CESL is intended to overcome the boundaries of 
national contractual regimes.43 Th e case of European Cooperative Society makes it clear 
that such a declaration in itself is insuffi  cient to bring the measure within the ambit of 
Article 114 TFEU. Furthermore, the mere fact of the CESL does not mean that Member 
States’ contract laws are themselves replaced. If there is method to the choice of Article 
114 TFEU rather than mere madness, then that provision must permit the adoption of 
measures which do not need at fi rst blush to harmonize the laws of the Member States. 
Two cases, delineating the border between Articles 114 and 352 TFEU, are instructive.44
In Smoke Flavouring,45 the applicant sought the annulment of Regulation 2065/2003 
– based on Article 114 TFEU – on the use of smoke fl avouring in food. One of the 
applicant’s main arguments was that the solution as embodied in the Regulation was not 
in the way of approximating Member State laws. What the measure sought instead to do 
was to set up a European agency to oversee a centralized procedure for the authorization 
of smoke fl avouring for food products.
Th e Court rejected this argument. It reasoned that the draft ers of Article 114 TFEU 
intended ‘to confer a discretion, depending on the general context and the specifi c 
circumstances of the matter to be harmonized, as regards the method of approximation 
most appropriate for achieving the desired result, in particular in fi elds with complex 
technical features’.46 Such discretion ‘may be used in particular to choose the most 
appropriate harmonisation technique where the proposed approximation requires 
physical, chemical or biological analyses to be made and scientifi c developments in the 
fi eld concerned to be taken into account’ (emphasis added).47 What was important was 
whether the centralized authorization procedure ‘was designed in such a way that it leads 
to harmonization within the meaning of [Article 114 TFEU]’.48 In the ensuing analysis 
of the ambit of the Regulation, the Court found that the procedure mandated strict 
conditions for authorization, with corresponding rights and obligations throughout 
43 CESL recital 8.
44 It would do to point out that these same cases were analysed succinctly by K. Gutman, European Review 
of Contract Law (2011) regarding the principle of subsidiarity, i.e. the exercise of competence. Th is 
paper considers the same cases within the context of the existence of competence.
45 Case C-66/04 United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council (‘Smoke Flavouring’) [2005] ECR I-10553.
46 Ibid., para. 45. See also Case C-217/04 United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council (‘ENISA’) [2006] ECR 
I-3771, para. 43 to 45.
47 Dicta applied in the Case C-217/04 ENISA, para. 43; Case C-58/08 Th e Queen, on the application of 
Vodafone Ltd and Others v. Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [2010] 
ECR I-04999, para. 35. For earlier pedigree of this line of reasoning, see also Case C-359/92 Germany v. 
Council (‘Product Safety’) [1994] ECR I-3681.
48 Case C-66/04 Smoke Flavouring, para. 49 and 50.
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the Member States. Due to the manner in which the procedure panned out, the Court 
reasoned, it was impossible to suggest that the result was not the harmonization of 
Member States’ laws on the regulation of smoke fl avourings.
Th e second case is ENISA.49 Regulation 460/2004, also based on Article 114 
TFEU, sought to establish a harmonized framework for the regulation of electronic 
communications and associated facilities and services through the setting up of a 
centralized agency. Th e UK challenged the basis of the Regulation, arguing that the 
setting up of an agency with the ability to issue non-binding guidelines could not be 
considered a measure for the approximation of laws.
Th e CJEU disagreed.
Adopting dicta from Smoke Flavouring, it held that the setting up of the agency must 
be seen as a step in the fl ight of stairs leading to eventual harmonization. Th e Court 
emphasized the need for the tasks of the agency to be ‘closely linked to the subject-matter 
of the acts approximating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the 
Member States’, stating that ‘[s]uch is the case where the [Union] body thus established 
provides services to national authorities and/or operators which aff ect the homogenous 
implementation of harmonising instruments and which are likely to facilitate their 
application’.50 In that regard, it put the function of the agency within the larger framework 
of the Union’s plans and policy for the regulation of electronic communication within the 
single market, since its advice to the Commission and the Member States would amongst 
other things aid in the transposition and implementation of related Union measures. So 
long as the agency contributed in that function, it was a measure for the approximation 
of Member States’ laws within the meaning of Article 114 TFEU.
Th e manner in which European Cooperative Society reasoned the non-applicability 
of Article 114 TFEU is, prima facie, diffi  cult to square with that of Smoke Flavouring 
and ENISA. In all three cases, the measure at hand appeared to have left  unmolested the 
diverse laws of the Member States, and yet the Court arrived at diametrically opposed 
conclusions. What all three have in common is that the CJEU shied from second-
guessing the Union policy maker’s decision in polycentric matters,51 and thereby its 
choice of legal basis. In so doing, the Court tolerates discretion as to the manner in which 
approximation is eventually achieved.
As a result, what emerges from a juxtaposition of these cases is a latent ambiguity 
as to where the extent of one legal basis ends and another begins. Th e key to that 
determination turns on the question of remoteness – the Court appears to grapple with 
the eff ect the measure may have, on its own and in the context of the framework in 
which it may be operating, on approximating laws. In this way, a parallel can be drawn 
with the way the Court uses notions of remoteness to demarcate when legal diversity 
49 Case C-217/04 ENISA.
50 Ibid., para. 45.
51 L. Fuller, ‘Th e forms and limits of adjudication’, 92 Harvard Law Review (1978).
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is ‘appreciably’ a distortion to competition within the meaning of Article 114 TFEU 
as understood post-Tobacco Advertising:52 that the eff ect of divergent laws on media 
advertising and competitive pressures in Tobacco Advertising had a more remote eff ect 
on preventing cross border trade and distorting competition than, say, production costs 
in Titanium Dioxide.53
Returning to the issue at hand, one is tempted to square the circle by saying that the 
cases are distinguishable on their facts. Th at is to say, the setting up of the agencies in 
Smoke Flavouring and ENISA can be characterized as a step – however indirect – towards 
an approximation of laws. On the other hand, by articulating in European Cooperative 
Society that the Member States’ laws were left  ‘unchanged’, the Court could be suggesting 
that the approximating eff ect of the Union measure in that case was too uncertain.
In any event, on this reading of the cases, it is clear that a Union measure does not 
ipso facto need to replace Member States’ laws, but that its harmonizing eff ect over time 
on those same laws will need to be shown. In this sense, the case law on legal bases does 
not distinguish ‘between harmonisation in the sense of reducing disparities, on the one 
hand, and the creation of new legal forms, on the other’.54
Th e pertinent question thus becomes: how certain must the measure’s eff ect be 
on approximating Member States’ laws for Article 114 TFEU to be triggered? Recall 
that in ENISA, the Court held that the eff ect of the regulation in question qualifi ed as 
approximation. It did not follow AG Kokott’s Opinion, which was that the Regulation 
was ‘not so much an intermediate step on the way to the approximation of laws of the 
Member States as a step into the uncertain’.55 She noted that the tasks of the agency 
established by the Regulation were to provide information to and encourage the 
cooperation of private actors. She did not deny the potential for these tasks to contribute 
towards approximation, but the fact of the agency’s limited powers meant it is not at all 
certain that the measure would lead to that result.
Commenting on the correctness of ENISA, Tridimas argues that the ambit of Article 
114 TFEU has to be ‘determined by reference to the substantive content of the measures 
adopted and not by the instrumentalities of approximation’.56 In this way, he characterized 
the agency’s need to cooperate with private actors as a mere instrumentality and therefore 
irrelevant as to whether the measure is capable of approximating the laws of Member 
States. On the other hand, he reasoned, the substantive content of the measure relates to 
the fact that the agency does not have decision-making powers but fulfi ls a coordinating 
and advisory role within the larger context of regulating this fi eld of law. According to 
Tridimas, these features go towards the intermediacy of the step.
52 Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising.
53 Case C-300/89 Commission v. Council (‘Titanium Dioxide’) [1991] ECR-I-02867.
54 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-436/03 European Cooperative Society.
55 Ibid., para. 36.
56 T. Tridimas, ‘Community Agencies, Competition Law, and ECSB Initiatives on Securities Clearing and 
Settlement’, 28 Yearbook of European Law (2009), p. 240.
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Yes, it is an intermediate step – but to where? It is somewhat unconvincing that there 
ought to exist a distinction in law between substantive content and instrumentalities 
of approximation. It is suggested that Tridimas’ phrase is an allusion to dicta in Smoke 
Flavourings, which accorded a discretion to the Union legislator as to the appropriateness 
of harmonization technique.57 With respect, such instrumentalities do matter and in the 
way Kokott described they would. Th e Commission’s 2004 Action Plan on European 
Contract Law itself emphasized the link between the form of a measure and choice 
of legal basis.58 Tellingly, the Court in ENISA made no such distinction, and, it is 
submitted, for good reason: the mere existence of the discretion to choose an appropriate 
harmonization technique has no bearing on a measure’s eff ect on approximating the laws 
of Member States. It would do to reiterate to the reader that the measure’s eff ect in ENISA 
was deemed suffi  cient to contribute towards the approximation of Member State laws.
Th e true reason for Tridimas’ distinction appears to be the concern that Kokott’s 
position ‘forecloses institutional experimentation of which we need more rather than 
less. By requiring certainty of result, it leaves in fact little room for innovation and 
hinders the quest for optimum structures of government’.59 It is clear that absolute 
certainty is not required, but the lack of jurisprudence does not permit any further 
precision. If this were a plausible explanation for the Court’s decision, it would do well 
to ensure that the margin of error accorded to the intermediacy of the measure as a step 
towards approximation is not unduly wide. For otherwise, to paraphrase its own concern 
in Tobacco Advertising, the Court’s review of the choice of legal basis might be rendered 
nugatory.60
B. THE CESL AS A STEP, BUT WHERE TO?
If one is not of the view that the CESL replaces or harmonizes Member States’ 
contract laws,61 the instrument may be characterized as an intermediate step towards 
approximation. Th e mere fact that the CESL is an optional instrument does not settle 
the matter, insofar as the Union legislator must be accorded due discretion under Article 
114 TFEU on the use of optional instruments as a technique of harmonization. Instead, 
much turns on the eff ect of the CESL on harmonizing the contract laws of the Member 
States.
57 See Case C-436/03 European Cooperative Society, para. 44.
58 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: European 
Contract Law and the revision of the acquis: the way forward, COM (2004) 651 fi nal at Annex II, p. 21 
and 22. Specifi cally, that ‘the question of legal basis is closely linked with the questions of the legal form 
of the optional instrument, of its content and its scope’.
59 T. Tridimas, 28 Yearbook of European Law (2009).
60 Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising, para. 84.
61 For the argument on the second legal regime as a technique for approximating national laws, see below 
at Section 5.
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One might say that by introducing another product to the assortment in Europe’s 
contract law market, the CESL actually achieves the opposite eff ect – it is an intermediate 
step towards legal diversity. On the other hand, considering the dynamics of regulatory 
competition, the CESL may instigate a convergence of the laws in question.62 Th is is also 
clearly stated in the Commission’s 2007 paper setting out its single market agenda.63 
Put simply, if the CESL is attractive to private parties, they may ‘vote with their feet’, 
choosing this optional instrument over the Member States’ contract regimes. If enough 
voting occurs, Member States may be subject to a competitive pressure to align their 
respective rules towards what parties want (that is, the CESL), in order to retain or attract 
use of their rules. Th e CESL may in this way be seen as an intermediate step towards 
harmonization within the meaning of Article 114 TFEU. Th at having been said, if the 
votes are insuffi  cient to eff ect such a change in national laws, then Article 114 TFEU 
would not be available and Article 352 TFEU may be the correct provision to undergird 
the CESL.
In their reasoned opinions on the subsidiarity of the CESL, the House of Commons 
expressed the fear that the CESL’s popularity will lead to a de facto harmonization of 
contract law (or more cynically, the demise of English commercial law),64 whilst the 
Portuguese parliament happily noted that the CESL ‘[promotes] evolution at a pace 
determined by the consent of parties, leaving the initiative and decision on eventual 
extensions to the Member States – could [sic] actually be an example of “intelligent 
approximation”’.65 Yet, there is no certainty that regulatory competition leads to 
convergence. Th e preconditions of convergence include homogeneity of preferences66 
and incentives67 for Member States to align their rules, and there would appear evidence 
of neither within this area of law. In the wider context, there is no evidence linking 
the introduction of optional instruments in company or intellectual property law to the 
convergence of the relevant Member States’ laws. Indeed, the cases previously analysed 
lead to the conclusion that the law does not require certainty of eff ect.
In such a context, can the argument be advanced that the CESL at the very least 
contributes towards a convergence of contract laws in the manner reasoned in ENISA? 
Viewed from the lens of regulatory competition, the answer is dependent on whether 
62 J. Smits, ‘European Private Law: A Plea for a Spontaneous Legal Order’, in D. Curtin and J. Smits (eds.), 
European Integration and Law (Intersentia, Antwerp 2006).
63 See Communication from the Commission, COM (2007) 725 fi nal.
64 See the House of Commons opinion (last page) at www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/document/
COM20110635FIN.do (last visited 20 December 2011).
65 Ibid., the personal opinion of the rapporteur to the European Aff airs Committee of the Portuguese 
Parliament ([3] at p. 7).
66 For instance, a critical mass of private parties who prefer cross-border contract laws such as that off ered 
by the CESL. On the contrary, see G. Low, ‘Will Firms Consider a European Optional Instrument?’, 
European Journal of Law and Economics (forthcoming), p. 347–352.
67 For instance, if that jurisdiction’s legal services sector would decline as a result of migration, leading to 
a loss of tax receipts or employment.
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and the extent to which private parties consider and opt for it, and the relevant features 
of the CESL itself.
One of the CESL’s objectives is to help traders avoid multiple compliance costs due to 
the diversity of mandatory consumer protection rules. Th is has been partly resolved by 
the Consumer Rights Directive (CRD),68 although due to its narrow ambit, the problem 
of diversity in other sectors still remains. If the scope of the CESL’s consumer rules is 
comprehensive, fi rms wishing to trade across a multitude of Member States will have 
a real incentive to opt for it.69 Th is may constitute a competitive advantage over the 
laws of Member States, whose rules on consumer protection do (and can) not extend 
beyond their territorial borders,70 and especially since the CRD does not fully resolve the 
fragmentation in the consumer acquis. Unfortunately, there is no incentive to opt for the 
CESL on this point, since the relevant CESL rules mirror those of the CRD.
Another major objective is to help Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) to 
trade across the single market and avoid the costs of constantly adapting transactions 
to diff erent national rules. Does this mean that SMEs will vote for the CESL? Th is may 
depend on the following two factors.71 Firstly, what are European fi rms’ aspirations? Some 
fi rms are domestic-focused, and, for them, the problem of legal diversity is irrelevant. 
SMEs, in contradistinction to larger fi rms, may not intend to trade across the entire 
single market, and therefore the cost of legal diversity is one of magnitude.72 Th e CESL’s 
attractiveness is thus hostage to a variety of commercial ambitions. Secondly, what are 
fi rms’ voting habits? For a variety of reasons,73 fi rms, like individuals, appear fond of 
familiarity. Firms stick stubbornly to the standard terms and governing laws already 
used. Problems that can be resolved are resolved without changing laws, for instance, 
by refi ning standard terms. If there is no choice but to change, the likely candidates are 
those they are familiar with, not the new kid on the European block.74 One may question 
68 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer 
rights, [2011] OJ L 304/64.
69 K. Riesenhuber, ‘A Competitive Approach to EU Contract Law’, 7 European Review of Contract Law 2 
(2011) (the author also considers the costs as stemming from the legal uncertainty of using an untested 
instrument).
70 Ibid.
71 G. Low, European Journal of Law and Economics (forthcoming).
72 UEAPME, Common European Sales Law no panacea for trade in the single market say SMEs, Press 
Release, 11 October 2011.
73 Th ese may be due to the following behavioural tendencies which induce people not to choose what 
may be best for themselves – see G. Low, ‘Th e (Ir)relevance of Harmonisation and Legal Diversity to 
European Contract Law: A Perspective from Psychology’, 18 European Review of Private Law 2 (2010).
74 For empirical studies showing the unpopularity of optional instruments, see for instance M.W. Gordon, 
‘Some Th oughts on the Receptiveness of Contract Rules in the CISG and UNIDROIT Principles as 
Refl ected in One’s State (Florida) Experience of (1) Law School Faculty, (2) Members of the Bar with an 
International Practice, and (3) Judges’, 46 American Journal of Comparative Law (Supplement) (1998). 
As regards the CESL being distinguishable, this is possibly by off ering a comprehensive set of EU-wide 
mandatory consumer protection rules – which is not the case. For this and other reasons on the limited 
eff ectiveness of such instruments, see Nicole Kornet’s contribution in this issue at p. 164–179.
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the vigour of regulatory competition, since Member States have no pressure to compete, 
innovate or improve their rules, if voters do not walk with their feet. Th e CESL as an 
intermediate step towards harmonization is in doubt, since this entire argument rests on 
the proper functioning of regulatory competition.
Next, and on the assumption that the CESL is to be seen as an intermediate step 
towards harmonization, what features does it possess that go towards its competitiveness 
in the law market? Just as in ENISA, the Commission has to take stock of the CESL’s 
progress fi ve years from the date of the instrument’s entry.75 Furthermore, similar 
to ENISA’s information gathering functions, it is charged with setting up a database 
of national decisions on the interpretation of the CESL.76 It would be conjecture to 
extrapolate the eff ects of these features, especially since the Commission itself has yet 
to commit to whether and how it intends to use the CESL to compete in the law market. 
Th e database is a good fi rst step in overcoming information asymmetry, but there are 
limits to that approach.77 Perhaps the way forward is to collect data on how contract laws 
are chosen in general, and in particular, how the CESL is considered. Th is may provide 
feedback to the Commission when it has to present its progress report on the CESL. 
It cannot be said that these measures will lead to the approximation of Member State 
laws, but that level of inevitability is not required. Importantly, it is not clear from the 
preamble to the CESL how it fi ts in with the overall framework for regulating contract 
law within the single market, or how the CESL’s features are intended to induce the 
competitive pressures necessary to encourage de facto harmonization. Th is is unlike that 
of the agency in ENISA, whose tasks of encouraging cooperation and providing advice 
on implementation are clearly stipulated in its Regulation.
In short, it is possible to conceive of the CESL as an intermediate step towards 
harmonization for the purposes of satisfying Article 114(1) TFEU, replacing the tasks of 
the agencies in ENISA and Smoke Flavourings with the tools of regulatory competition. 
However, and while absolute certainty of achieving harmonizing is not required, there 
remain doubts as to whether a regulatory competition of contract law leads to de facto 
harmonization, as well as whether and the extent to which the CESL’s features contribute 
to this process. As it stands, the CESL’s eff ect seems closer to European Cooperative 
Society than to ENISA or Smoke Flavouring. If the CESL is to be seen as an intermediate 
step towards harmonization, it would do well to be placed within the larger context of 
harmonization of for example European contract law or private law, and for there to be 
an explanation within the explanatory memorandum and preamble of how the CESL 
and its fl anking measures are intended to contribute to such a harmonization endeavour. 
In so doing, the CESL would be clothed as an instrumentality of harmonization. As 
mentioned previously, the CJEU accords discretion to the Union legislator as regards 
75 Article 15 CESL.
76 Ibid., Article 14.
77 G. Low, European Journal of Law and Economics (forthcoming), indicating that there is a limit to the 
amount of information actors can and are willing to process.
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its choice of instrumentality, for fear of otherwise dampening the quest for optimal 
governance structures.
§5. 28th VERSUS 2nd – A DEFENSIBLE DISTINCTION?
Th ere is a peculiar distinction between the CESL and all other optional instruments that 
have come before it. Th e CESL is not intended as a 28th legal system alongside national 
regimes, but is to be incorporated as a second set of rules within the national legal 
system. Th e reason for this is that if the CESL was introduced as a 28th legal system, a 
party to a consumer transaction opting for it would exercise a choice for the purposes 
of Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation, thus triggering the operation of Article 6 of the 
Rome I Regulation – that is to say, that the mandatory rules of the consumer’s habitual 
residence apply regardless of the choice of law of the contract. Th is raises the possibility 
of a diversity of mandatory consumer rules, a problem the instrument is intended to 
solve. Cloaking the CESL as a second national regime cleverly avoids this issue – since 
Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation is not triggered.78
Is this diff erence between a 28th and a 2nd regime of any consequence as regards the 
choice of legal basis? More specifi cally, does the fact of a 2nd regime change Member 
States’ laws? If so, is this change in the way of converging Member States’ laws? Clearly, 
if the case for the CESL can be made, the role of Article 352 TFEU would be limited to 
truly European optional instruments of the 28th variety, and the CESL would be the 
progenitor for a new breed of Article 114-based Euro-national optional instruments.
Th e CESL as a second national regime means that it would, as it were, simply be 
English or German law plus. As Clive succinctly states,79 the CESL is optional to private 
parties, but is mandatory to Member States. Th at is to say, if a valid choice of law is made 
in favour of the CESL, Member States are obliged to recognize that the relevant portion of 
purely national law is replaced by its national albeit hybridized cousin; though, in other 
respects, the contract in question remains reliant on national law.
One might thus argue that the CESL approximates national contract law regimes 
in the following way. While purely national contract rules are not altered, the ‘reach’ of 
these rules is changed by the CESL’s application. Th is may be coupled with the fact that 
78 M. Hesselink, ‘How to opt into the Common European Sales Law? Brief Comments on the 
Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation’, CSECL Working Paper 2011–15, p. 2. But see in this issue E. 
Clive’s contribution ‘A general perspective on the European Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation on 
a Common European Sales Law (CESL)’, 19 MJ 1 (2012) on whether Article 6 of the Rome Regulation 
confl icts with the mandatory consumer rules within the CESL, as well as G. Rühl’s contribution 
(critiquing the second-legal regime technique on this and other grounds from the perspective of private 
international law).
79 See Eric Clive, 19 MJ 1 (2012), p. 120–131, where the author points out that the CESL is optional to 
private parties, but not to Member States.
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all the hybridised portions of national regimes are the same. Th is appears, by any other 
name, to be full harmonization.
On the other hand, that the CESL aff ects the ‘reach’ of national contract rules is an 
ambivalent argument to make: it seems odd to say, for instance, that the terms of a widely 
used standard form contract aff ect the ‘reach’ of national default rules such that national 
contract law regimes are changed. Th e fact that the CESL/English hybrid is chosen does 
not necessarily imply any replacement of English law. Notwithstanding any convergence 
due to regulatory competition, the very coexistence of these two sets of rules militates 
against the conclusion that purely national law is itself changed.80
At a good hundred pages and 186 articles, the CESL deals comprehensively with the 
contract of sale – which is indeed the intention of the draft ers.81 Having said that, the 
CESL is not a completely self-contained system. It remains reliant on national law, for 
instance, to determine the proprietary eff ects of transactions. Crucially, is the CESL’s 
reliance on national law peripheral such that it is a distinct legal form, or so fundamental 
as to be inextricably intertwined in the national legal order? Th e CESL has to be 
comprehensive enough to be attractive to its users. Yet, the more comprehensive it is 
(and thus the more peripheral its reliance on national law), the more that the CESL tends 
to fall within the rubric of European Cooperative Society.
To sum up the two sides, proponents of Article 114 TFEU would do well to focus 
on the fact that the CESL is a national hybrid set of contractual rules, and equate this 
hybridization with approximation within the meaning of Article 114 TFEU. With an 
eye to European Cooperative Society, opponents ought to dwell on the fact that purely 
national contractual rules remain unmolested, distinguishing the national from the 
hybrid in the same way one distinguishes a 28th regime from the other 27.
Plus ça change. Th e fact is that by parachuting a set of contractual rules within and 
next to a national legal system, the national rules are paradoxically harmonized and 
unharmonized. In this context, the line between the two legal bases remains judicially 
unsettled – making a distinction between optional instruments of the 28th and 2nd 
species for the purposes of choice of legal bases does not solve the question of whether the 
‘law, regulation or administrative action’ of Member States are thereby approximated. 
Th e issue simply morphs into what one considers ‘national’. Space constraints deny this 
author the liberty to explore where the line ought to be drawn. Suffi  ce it to say that should 
the matter come before the CJEU, much may depend on whether the Bench shares 
with the Commission a pro-integration attitude, the need to encourage innovation in 
overcoming national barriers, as well as the urgency of putting the single market agenda 
back on track.
80 Yet the Austrian Federal Council frets that the mere insertion of a second legal regime would upset 
the century-long coherency of the Austrian private legal order. See www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/
document/COM20110635FIN.do (last visited 20 December 2011).
81 See for instance E. Clive, 19 MJ 1 (2012), p. 120–131.
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§6. CONCLUSION
Th e Commission has proceeded to base the CESL on Article 114 TFEU, in spite of 
recommendations to use Article 352 TFEU for optional instruments. As an optional 
instrument, the CESL does not ipso facto replace national contract laws, and thus the 
question arises whether the measure falls within the meaning of the term ‘approximation’ 
of Article 114(1) TFEU.
One possibility, using the lens of regulatory competition is to suggest that the CESL 
is an intermediate step towards harmonization. However, it is questionable whether 
regulatory competition will lead to the required degree of harmonization, and whether 
the CESL’s features demonstrate that it contributes within a wider context to that 
process of harmonization. Another possibility is to distinguish the CESL from other 
optional instruments on the basis that it is a second national regime. Th at is to say, the 
hybridization of national law can be equated with approximation.
Clearly, either justifi cation for the use of Article 114 TFEU is plausible, just as they 
are open to debate. Th is is precisely the dilemma that the Commission must face if it is to 
defend its current choice of legal basis. If the issue is brought before the CJEU, the CESL 
might end up as the Commission’s Tobacco Advertising III, forcing it to re-experience 
tremors of competence anxiety.82 On the other hand, if the Commission risks litigation 
and obtains a favourable judgment, the future of positive integration may be one of 
unitas via diversitas. One may then say, with due measure of irony, that the very symbol 
of diversity – an optional instrument – is also a tool for achieving harmonization.
82 S. Weatherill, ‘Competence Creep and Competence Control’, 23 Yearbook of European Law 1 (2004).
